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Introduction
A growing literature has examined the effect that candidate 
profiles have on voter choice (e.g. Campbell and Cowley, 
2013; Fisher et al., 2014; Johns and Shephard, 2008; 
Johnson and Rosenblatt, 2007). Candidate demographics 
have been demonstrated to alter voters’ perceptions of such 
traits as competence and trustworthiness, and thereby the 
likelihood of vote. Similarly, candidates’ origins and resi-
dential location have been shown to influence vote once 
traditional determinants have been controlled for 
(Arzheimer and Evans, 2012; Gorecki and Marsh, 2012, 
2014). Most of this recent work examined national elec-
tions. However, older research into voter geography often 
focused on local elections (Cox, 1968; Johnston, 1973; 
Rice and Macht, 1987), and there are good reasons for 
expecting that ‘distance effects’ – voters assessing compet-
ing candidates in terms of their geographical proximity – 
should be stronger at the local level. Building on the model 
developed for an analysis of distance effects in the 2010 
General Election in England, this paper tests the hypothesis 
that, other things being equal, voters in the 2013 local elec-
tions for English County Councils will have preferred can-
didates who live closer to them.
Why voter distance should matter 
locally
Previous research into the effect of localism on voting sug-
gests that such influences would be more likely at the local 
than at the national level. For example, Johnston’s New 
Zealand study (1973) speculated that effects found in the 
1968 Christchurch City Council election would be less 
likely to occur at the national level, where party loyalty 
should exercise greater effect. Many US studies of proxim-
ity on vote have looked at sub-national elections, such as 
gubernatorial races (Gimpel et al., 2008). Work on presi-
dential elections has focused more on the ‘home-state 
advantage’ hypothesis, and its applicability to different ter-
ritorial aggregations (Garand, 1988; Lewis-Beck and Rice, 
1983). In the British case, qualitative evidence indicates 
that voters want local Members of Parliament (MPs), 
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perhaps above all else, and parties are aware of this 
(Campbell and Cowley, 2013; Evans, 2012), but there has 
been no test of the extent to which distance or localness 
plays a role in local elections.
Many of the theoretical arguments extended for both 
national and local elections do point to the latter’s greater 
relevance. Firstly, local election candidates may be expected 
to have a stronger vested interest in the whole area that they 
are representing. For a British Parliamentary candidate, the 
area represented, that is, the constituency, is often territori-
ally sizeable – an average of 37,000 hectares.1 Voters may 
expect that a representative living in that constituency will 
be more likely to represent its interests in a more capable 
fashion, given accessibility, but the candidate is less likely 
to be perceived as being implanted in a single community. 
In a County Council electoral division (ED) with a much 
smaller territorial size – on average, just over 5000 hectares 
– the notion of a council representative rooted in a single 
community has greater credibility.
Secondly, in the British case, the political context of rep-
resenting a smaller ED provides a clearer logical connec-
tion between voter expectations and candidate interests 
than at the constituency level. Whilst MPs will spend a sig-
nificant proportion of their time working on national policy 
issues in Westminster, local councillors will spend the 
majority of their time in their locality, working on issues 
relevant only to the local authority area. Furthermore, the 
possibility of contact between councillor and voter is 
greater – and, as Norman et al. (2007: 59) note, the reform 
of local councillors’ roles in the Local Government Act 
2000 has underlined the importance of that councillor– 
electorate linkage. Thirdly, then, the ‘personal vote’ theory 
is highly relevant to local elections. Direct evidence of ret-
rospective delivery of benefit to the community, or pro-
spective perception, of a candidate’s capacity to deliver 
will count in his or her favour. The ‘constituency attentive-
ness’ found in general election constituencies (Cain et al., 
1984: 115) should transfer to the local election division.
Finally, whatever the link between voter and councillor 
or council candidate, the distance hypothesis can only hold 
if voters are aware of candidate location. In the General 
Election test, the candidate’s home address on the ballot 
papers means this information is available, but the assump-
tion that voters can parse the location other than to realise 
whether it is in their direct locale or not is a large one. 
Nonetheless, we found evidence that voters are indeed 
including the notion of distance in their vote calculus 
(Arzheimer and Evans, 2012). This assumption is much 
less heroic at the local level, involving smaller and more 
familiar districts for a voter.
Of course, given the much-reduced distances of local 
election candidates’ residences from any voter in the ED, a 
counter-hypothesis would be that relative distance becomes 
irrelevant – any candidate is likely to be deemed ‘local’. 
Compared with General Elections, the qualification criteria 
for local councillor candidates in England and Wales are far 
more stringent, requiring candidates to be resident in or 
working in the local authority area in which they wish to 
stand for 12 months previously.2 Nevertheless, the resi-
dency requirements are for the local authority area – the 
county, rather than the ED itself. The bounds of variation in 
distance are therefore sufficiently large to allow a distance 
effect to manifest itself. In the County Council case, areas 
within EDs will be familiar to voters, and potentially divi-
sive. Our expectation, then, is that voters are aware of their 
local environment, and will assume better representation 
from a candidate based closer to or in that local environ-
ment, than from a candidate in an adjoining ED or further 
afield, other things being equal.
Refining distance analysis in voting
Our analysis of the 2010 General Elections in England pro-
vided a first step to understanding the relationship between 
voter–candidate distance and party choice at the individual 
level (Arzheimer and Evans, 2012). Controlling for politi-
cal preference, incumbency and socio-economic context, 
we found that the distance between voter and candidate 
residence did matter. Substantively, the effect was small but 
significant. Using the parameter estimates from the condi-
tional logit model in a simulation of candidate residence 
locations, we estimated that a much more distant location 
for a candidate would cost her between nine per cent (for a 
Labour candidate) and 16 per cent (for a Tory candidate).
It is important to look for evidence of this effect in a dif-
ferent electoral context. Furthermore, the County Council 
elections of 2013 allow us to improve upon our General 
Election test in a number of ways. Firstly, in order to pro-
vide a consistent choice-set across the country, we only pre-
viously included candidates from the three main parties that 
fielded candidates in all English constituencies. Arguably, 
the United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP), a right-
wing Eurosceptic party that had finished second in the 2009 
European election, had established itself as a national chal-
lenger in the 2010 General Election, fielding candidates in 
558 constituencies. The saliency of the UKIP campaign on 
immigration controls, fighting crime and anti-social behav-
iour, as well as its continued anti-European rhetoric, con-
solidated its challenge to the Conservative Party in the 
County Council elections, winning it 147 council seats, 
underlining the need to include it as part of the consistent 
choice-set in 2013. This does omit a number of EDs where 
three-party competition – generally an absent Liberal 
Democrat or UKIP candidate, but also a number with 
Labour missing – is the norm. We would need to test sepa-
rate models to confirm that the role of distance is not 
dependent upon party supply.
A second constraint was the withholding of residential 
addresses by a minority of Parliamentary candidates, invok-
ing the statutory change to the Electoral Law (Political 
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Parties and Elections Bill, SN/PC/05004).3 For the County 
Council elections, there has been no such relaxation of the 
electoral law – candidates are required to provide their 
home address, which is published on the Statement of 
Persons Nominated (SoPN) and on the ballot paper.
Thirdly, we were unable to identify the precise location 
of voter residence using the British Election study. Only the 
first cluster of identifiers (the ‘Outward Code’) was avail-
able from the postcode, which denotes a relatively large 
area. The smallest locational unit included was the respond-
ent’s electoral ward. Consequently, we used the ward cen-
troid – the centre of gravity for any geographical polygon 
– as the best estimate of their home address. Inevitably this 
solution introduces error into the estimation but, with no 
reason to suspect any pattern to the distance between cen-
troid and latent home address of voters, this error should be 
noise, and not therefore bias our estimates. In the County 
Council elections, the survey used to tap relevant voter 
information, which we discuss in more detail in the data 
section below, did include the full postcode for each 
respondent. Under strict conditions of anonymity and 
embargo, then, we were able to use this postcode together 
with the candidate postcodes to identify the exact distance 
between the two.4
Fourthly, UK General Elections are prey to the phenom-
enon of candidates renting accommodation in constituen-
cies for the duration of the election, and providing this as 
their home address. The location or extent of this practice is 
unclear, but where present this might influence a voter’s 
perception of distance, if they are aware of the nature of the 
location, that is, a rented property rather than ‘true’ resi-
dence. In County Council elections, residency requirements 
of at least a year mean that council candidates are unable to 
move into the area simply for the short term, and the likeli-
hood of them renting for a sufficient period simply for 
political reasons, at this level of governance, is very small. 
We can therefore be certain of the validity of the address as 
long-term residence.
The final improvement we would note relates to the 
notion of localness, in terms of understanding its proper-
ties. The counties form an auspicious geographical unit on 
which to test this. While driving distance formed a useful 
first proof of a stable distance effect in the General Election, 
it is not the only measurement of distance that might matter 
in voting. Firstly, distance in terms of where voters and can-
didates live might usefully be conceptualised in terms of a 
dyadic ‘local or not’ perception, based upon some notion of 
geographical locality. In the General Election, the impor-
tance of the driving distance tested with a fractional poly-
nomial suggests that the relationship was not a blunt ‘either/
or’. However, from a territorial point of view, constituen-
cies are relatively large areas, and to hypothesise that voters 
would regard presence or absence from the constituency by 
a candidate as the crucial distinction seemed arbitrary. 
Moreover, empirically, such a distinction would be clearest 
to voters in constituencies where candidates withheld their 
addresses, and instead gave their constituency of residence. 
By definition such voters were not in our analytical sample. 
For voters in constituencies where all three candidates gave 
their addresses, only candidates’ postal address is given, 
thereby relying on voters to be aware of proximity and con-
stituency location.
For County Council elections, however, the EDs are 
much smaller units, and as we have noted a candidate for 
this ED is required to have a formal presence in the local 
authority area. We assume that voters will be more aware of 
local addresses and geography, and therefore have a greater 
sense of whether addresses are inside or outside their ED. 
The extent and precision of this knowledge is unclear, how-
ever. Consequently, in the new model, we test the explana-
tory potential of three measurements as follows.
•• Home division: does the candidate live in the ED 
they are contesting or not?
•• Contiguity: does the candidate live in the ED 
they are contesting, a neighbouring ED or a non-
contiguous ED?
•• Distance: the Euclidean distance between voter and 
candidate residences.5
Data and method
Multiple data sources were used to provide the requisite 
information for this analysis. Information on voters, 
including residential postcode, voting behaviour at the 
County Council elections and party thermometer scores 
to measure party support were collected piggybacking 
on 10 waves of YouGov’s daily polling survey to its 
regular internet panel between 4 and 26 March 2013. 
From an initial sample of 17,194 covering Britain, an 
analytical sample of 1,354 was obtained after removing 
individuals in any authority other than non-metropolitan 
counties, voters in redistricted EDs, which prevented 
the inclusion of an incumbency control, non-voters, vot-
ers for minor parties or independent candidates, and 
voters living in EDs with either one or more of the four 
main parties missing, or more than one seat up for elec-
tion.6 The surveys were carried out before the beginning 
of the official campaign in order to minimise campaign 
conditioning of the party thermometer scores, and then 
immediately after the election on 2 May to record actual 
vote. Candidate information was collected during the 
two weeks preceding the elections from the relevant 
local government websites, where the SoPNs were 
posted as part of the Notice of Poll. Incumbency infor-
mation was collected after the election through the same 
websites.
The ED and county locations of voters and candidates 
were mapped using the Ordnance Survey Boundary-
Line™ vector shapefile and the Code-Point® point dataset, 
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which provides eastings and northings for all UK post-
codes. Each voter living in an ED with a council seat con-
tested by candidates from the four principal parties was 
then linked to the relevant candidates, and the distance 
between them calculated using a simple Euclidean calcula-
tion from eastings and northings for the straight-line dis-
tance.7 The maptools and spdep GIS packages in R were 
used to calculate the home division dummy and contiguity 
categorical measures.
The choropleth map in Figure 1 identifies the 626 EDs 
in 20 non-metropolitan counties across which the sample of 
voters is distributed, and the number of voters per ED.
Table 1 shows the distribution of candidates by resi-
dence, using the contiguity coding, in these 626 EDs.
Table 1 illustrates higher levels of local candidates 
amongst Conservatives and Liberal Democrats – above 86 
per cent in both cases – with UKIP almost 10 per cent 
lower, as a newer party recruiting a candidate base.
The conditional logit model itself is a discrete choice 
model that is a variant of multinomial logistic regression. 
The conditional logit model allows for the inclusion of so-
called ‘alternative-specific’ variables that test their effect 
on a set of choices each respondent must pick between. 
There are as many observations per individual respondent 
as there are valid alternatives – in this case, four. In our 
model, controlling for standard explanations of vote such 
as party incumbency and party feeling (a 0–10 thermometer 
score for each of the parties by respondent, acting as an 
instrument to pick up their normal vote), we test the inde-
pendent effect of distance on vote for one of the four party 
choices.8
Analysis
Table 2 presents the different specifications of the distance 
model.
Model 0 is an empty model simply controlling for 
party. As compared with the baseline Labour party, 
Conservatives and UKIP enjoy a higher likelihood of 
support, while the Liberal Democrats hold a deficit, 
reflecting both the overall outcome of the Council elec-
tions, and expectations of support in non-metropolitan 
counties. In Model 1, the inclusion of the incumbent and 
party feeling thermometers washes out the party effects, 
most notably in the case of the Conservatives, who were 
incumbent in more than half of the EDs in the sample (see 
Tables 3). Straight-line distance follows the expected 
direction, with greater distance resulting in lower likeli-
hood of vote. Similarly, the home-division measure sees 
greater support for candidates standing in their own ED. 
However, there is no evidence of a significant contiguity 
effect – whilst there is a significant difference between 
home and non-contiguous EDs, this difference is no 
greater than that with a neighbouring ED. Voters are con-
cerned by the location of a candidate outside the ED, but 
not where outside. As the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) demonstrates, this measure of distance results in 
the least powerful model of the three.
Conditional logit coefficients give a sense of the effect 
of variables, but do not lend themselves easily to real-world 
implications of distance. Tables 3 and 4 provide a simula-
tion of the effects of distance and of home ED residence, 
respectively, on each of the parties’ candidates, and how 
different scenarios play out in terms of voting support. The 
first three lines give (1) the average observed score on the 
party thermometers; (2) either the average distance from 
candidate to voter (Table 3) or the proportion of candidates 
living in their contested ED (Table 4); and (3) the propor-
tion of incumbent candidates. The ‘Real’ line gives the 
expected probabilities of vote for the four parties. In both 
tables, the Conservative and Liberal Democrat scores are 
very close to the observed values. The Labour score is 
somewhat under the observed vote, presumably because of 
low incumbency in council seats. Conversely, the UKIP 
score is much higher than observed, given the higher aver-
age party feeling score. An even higher expected score is 
dampened by the higher average distance that UKIP candi-
dates live from voters.
Turning to the simulations using straight-line distance, 
relatively small shifts in distance produce notable changes 
in the vote share. For scenario 1, all candidates are assumed 
to live at 5.1 km (the average observed distance across all 
candidates and voters) from the voter. The vote distribu-
tions change very little, with the only climb in vote share 
being for the UKIP candidates, again who on average live 
further away than their mainstream party counterparts. 
Scenarios 2–5 then keep all but one candidate at 5.1 km, in 
turn moving one candidate to 20 km away (the candidate 
moved to 20 km is denoted in bold text).
In interpreting the distance effects, we must bear in mind 
that the main effects logit model constrains the effect of 
distance to be the same across all parties – the observed dif-
ferences are due to the differing baseline probabilities for 
each party.9 Consequently, in this election, the largest losers 
from distant candidates are the Conservatives, with an eight 
per cent loss – and UKIP benefits slightly more from this 
loss than the other parties do. For UKIP, the move to 20 km 
results in a similarly large loss. Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats, starting from a lower electoral score, lose less 
in real terms from a non-local candidate. Probably the most 
striking finding is that distance can reduce UKIP support to 
the same level as the Liberal Democrats support. The geo-
graphical structure of competition would be sufficient to 
prevent the Liberal Democrats from being pushed down the 
party rankings into fourth place in the popular vote, as 
occurred in 2013 for this sample. The home ED simulations 
in Table 4 show similar, although less pronounced relative 
shifts, with a Conservative candidate outside the ED losing 
around five per cent when pitched against other home ED 
candidates.
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Conclusion
Distance matters for County Council elections. There is 
evidence that voters view representatives at the local level 
in terms of whether they are ‘from here’ or ‘from else-
where’. However, the notion of distance goes beyond that 
– the further away candidates are, the less appealing they 
are to voters, other things being equal. Voters do not appear 
to be distinguishing between neighbouring EDs and those 
that are non-contiguous – indeed, depending on the EDs in 
question, a neighbouring Division may be further away 
than some non-contiguous counterparts. Instead, rising dis-
tance matters whatever the location. Given the small size of 
County Council EDs, this distance does not need to be large 
to put a candidate outside the voter’s community.
Further study of how voters conceptualise their political 
geographical space would help provide a theoretically solid 
idea of whether distance matters more as a scale or as a 
categorical location. Our conclusions here are drawn solely 
Figure 1. Sampled non-metropolitan counties with number of voters per electoral division.
Note: light areas = not sampled; darker areas = larger number of voters (up to nine).
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from what we observe in the analysis. A larger sample 
might have allowed us to test both distance and contiguity 
categories simultaneously.10 A comparative study of dis-
tance effects across EDs with different two- and three-party 
competition would also allow a better understanding of 
how supply mitigates or accentuates distance.
Compared with the General Election test, the effect of 
localness (whether distance or categorical) appears 
stronger. Of course, this could be a reflection of the larger 
distances involved in Westminster constituencies, with 
voters accepting less physical proximity for representa-
tives standing for large territorial units. Nevertheless, the 
literature to date has underlined the likelihood of distance 
mattering more for sub-national ballots, and so to find 
this at least confirmed suggests that the distance effect 
spotted in the 2010 General Election analysis is less 
likely to have been by chance. Further analysis of the two 
elections – for example including UKIP in the choice-set 
for 2010, as well as of the forthcoming 2015 General 
Elections – will provide the opportunity for a further 
proof of concept.
Finally, the better quality data from the County Council 
survey now allows us to investigate some of the assump-
tions we needed to make to operationalise the model in 
2010. For example, the assumption that ward centroids 
could be used as an estimate of voter location can now be 
tested at least indirectly by overlaying Westminster con-
stituencies on the County Council voter sample, to allow a 
Table 2. Conditional logit estimates of party support in 2013 County Council elections in England.
Model 0 Model I Model II Model III
Conservatives .250** −.177 −.176 −.176
 (.083) (.149) (.149) (.148)
Lib Dems −.237* .232* .231* .218*
 (.094) (.129) (.129) (.126)
UKIP .128 .163 .165 .197*
 (.079) (.117) (.118) (.117)
Party feeling (0–10) – .552*** .552*** .554***
 (.022) (.022) (.022)
Incumbency – .806*** .804*** .800***
 (.113) (.112) (.111)
Straight-line distance (km) – – – −.026***
 (.008)
Home ED – .242** .260* –
 (.094) (.137)  
Neighbour ED – – .026 –
 (.138)  
(Non-neighbour ED) – – – –
Pseudo-R2 .011 .491 .491 .492
BIC 3701.3 1944.2 1952.8 1939.3
N 5353
* p < 0.1; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
Note: all explanatory variables (except party controls) are alternative-specific, having separate values for each party and therefore including multiple 
observations per respondent.
UKIP: United Kingdom Independent Party; BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion; ED: electoral division.
Table 1. Location of candidates across four-party competitive non-metropolitan County Electoral Divisions (EDs).
% Conservative Lib Dems UKIP Labour TOTAL
Non-neighbouring ED 13.26 13.58 22.20 16.93 16.49
Neighbouring ED 29.87 35.30 27.80 31.95 31.23
Home ED 56.87 51.12 50.00 51.12 52.28
Total 100.00
(626)
Chi-square: 29.28 (6 df), p < .001.
UKIP: United Kingdom Independent Party.
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Table 3. Simulations of variations in candidate distance on vote share (%).
Conservative Lib Dems UKIP Labour
Party feeling (0–10) 5.36 4.29 5.50 4.55
Straight-line distance (km) 4.27 4.78 7.00 4.73
Incumbent 66.0% 25.4% 0.8% 5.1%
Reala 34.26 20.03 29.79 15.92
Scenario 1 33.37 19.77 31.16 15.69
Scenario 2 25.34 22.15 34.92 17.58
Scenario 3 35.64 14.31 33.29 16.76
Scenario 4 37.10 21.98 23.47 17.45
Scenario 5 35.15 20.82 32.82 11.20
aExpected probabilities of party vote conditional on the distribution of the explanatory variables.
Scenario 1 – all candidates at 5.1 km from notional voter.
Scenario 2 – bold candidate share moved to 20 km from voter.
UKIP: United Kingdom Independent Party.
test of the distribution of residual distances between voter 
address and the relevant ward centroid.
Overall, then, a relatively under-studied set of sub-
national elections provide a very useful case for retesting 
the localness hypothesis, and given the circumstances par-
ticular to 2013, to expand upon previous analyses to include 
minor parties such as UKIP. The analytical importance of 
distance in models of voting continues to make a case for 
itself.
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Notes
 1. Sizes calculated using OS Boundary-Line™ data. County 
Council Electoral Divisions cover all non-metropolitan 
counties in England. Westminster divisions include all 632 
British constituencies.
 2. Requirements are flexible for land occupation and residency, 
including occupancy of premises such as a tent or house-
boat. Electoral Commission, ‘Local elections in England and 
Wales: guidance for candidates and agents’, http://www.elec-
toralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/141784/
Table 4. Simulations of variations in candidate location on vote share (%).
Conservative Lib Dems UKIP Labour
Party feeling (0–10) 5.36 4.29 5.50 4.55
Home ED 57.4% 52.0% 46.0% 53.5%
Incumbent 66.0% 25.4% 0.8% 5.1%
Reala 34.08 20.23 29.83 15.86
Scenario 1 33.67 20.24 30.28 15.82
Scenario 2 28.50 21.82 32.64 17.05
Scenario 3 35.19 16.62 31.65 16.53
Scenario 4 36.00 21.65 25.43 16.92
Scenario 5 34.85 20.95 31.34 12.86
aExpected probabilities of party vote conditional on the distribution of the explanatory variables.
Scenario 1 – all candidates live in home ED.
Scenario 2 – bold candidate moved to another ED; others remain in home ED.
UKIP: United Kingdom Independent Party; ED: electoral division.
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Part-1-Can-you-stand-for-election-LGEW.pdf.
 3. For the first time in 2010, candidates could opt to provide 
only the constituency in which they lived on the Statement of 
Persons Nominated and the ballot paper.
 4. Strictly speaking, the postcode covers a small area rather 
than a pinpoint location. In terms of widely available loca-
tions that can reasonably be included in a large-n survey, this 
is still the most precise unit of observation, however.
 5. We tested three separate specifications of the model using 
straight-line distance, driving distance and driving time. As 
the correlation between all three was very high – no lower 
than for 0.95 for any pair-wise test – we report the straight-
line distance model, which is the simplest to calculate using 
eastings and northings in standard GIS packages.
 6. EDs with more than one seat up for election could not be 
included as the vote indicated by the survey respondent could 
not be identified as being cast for one specific candidate, bal-
lots including candidates for both seats simultaneously.
 7. A log-transformed measure accounting for the right skew in 
distance, which produces essentially identical results to the 
linear measure used here, is discussed and reported in the 
appendix (Table 1A).
 8. We also tested social deprivation as a possible influence on 
vote choice that might correlate spuriously with distance and 
vote choice. However, as with the General Election model, 
there was no discernible effect, so we exclude this in the 
reported model. Other possible controls, such as ‘distance 
from contention’, could be used (Fisher et al., 2014).
 9. To test for differential distance effects by party, we ran an 
alternative specification including a party–distance interac-
tion effect, which is reported and discussed in the appendix 
in Table 1A. The only evidence of a differential effect was 
for UKIP. We also tested for interactions between party and 
home ED, and party and party feeling, but there was no evi-
dence of any effect here. The replication .do file contains the 
syntax for all these first-order models.
10. Fractional polynomial models of distance should allow us to 
identify a more complicated distance effect that, for exam-
ple, plateaus after a certain distance away is reached. The 
model specifications we have run thus far using these frac-
tional polynomial measures of distance do not indicate any 
such non-linear effect.
Supplementary material
The replication files are available at: http://thedata.harvard.edu/
dvn/dv/researchandpolitics
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Appendix
A standard approach to linear distance is to log-transform it 
before inclusion in a model, to correct for the right skew 
inherent in a measure lower bounded by 0. The use of post-
codes in our model to estimate distance produces a small 
number of respondents with 0 distance, where the respond-
ent lives in the same postcode as one of the candidates. 
Because ln(0) is undefined, we add 25 metres to 0, being 
half the observed smallest distance, and intuitively a realis-
tic estimate of distance between two houses on a street. The 
resultant model IIIA is reported in Table 1A. We report this 
here, and retain the linear distance in the main paper, as the 
models are functionally identical and linear distance does 
not require an ad hoc correction.
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Model IV reports the linear distance model with an 
added party interaction term to examine whether distance 
affects the four parties’ candidates differentially. There is 
no evidence of differential effect for the three mainstream 
parties, but there is some evidence of a dampening effect 
for UKIP in this election. To understand the effect 
this has, Table 2A reports the simulations including the 
interaction effect. The change in UKIP vote as the 
candidate is moved 20 km away is notably smaller than 
for other parties (and simultaneously the Labour effect 
increases significantly). We present this as tentative evi-
dence that UKIP candidates in 2013 were less affected by 
distance as a ‘protest’ alternative to the mainstream. 
However, we would encourage caution in this interpreta-
tion, given the risk of retrospective overfitting for a single 
election.
Table 1A. Conditional logit estimates of party support in 2013 County Council elections in England [alternative specifications].
 Model IIIA  
(log-distance)













 (.043)  
Distance – −.060***
 (.020)
Conservatives × Distance – .028
 (.027)
Lib Dems × Distance – .014
 (.025)





* p < 0.1; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
UKIP: United Kingdom Independent Party; BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion.
Table 2A. Simulations of variations in candidate distance on vote share [alternative specification including party–distance 
interactions] (%).
Conservative Lib Dems UKIP Labour
Party feeling (0–10) 5.36 4.29 5.50 4.55
Straight-line distance (km) 4.27 4.78 7.00 4.73
Incumbent 66.0% 25.4% 0.8% 5.1%
Reala 34.43 19.87 30.06 15.64
Scenario 1 33.91 19.80 30.81 15.47
Scenario 2 24.14 22.73 35.37 17.76
Scenario 3 37.64 11.00 34.19 17.17
Scenario 4 34.96 20.41 28.68 15.95
Scenario 5 37.34 21.80 33.93  6.93
aExpected probabilities of party vote conditional on the distribution of the explanatory variables.
Scenario 1 – all candidates at 5.1 km from notional voter.
Scenario 2 – bold candidate share moved to 20 km from voter.
UKIP: United Kingdom Independent Party.
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